

FINAL REPORT



Governor's Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy

December 2011



Governor's Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy

January 9, 2012

To Members of the Legislature and Other Interested Stakeholders:

I am pleased to present the third and final report from the Governor's Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy, which closed its doors on December 31, 2011. This report summarizes the activities and accomplishments of the office during its four years of operation. The office was established by AB 1381 (Nuñez, 2007) and abolished by SB 92 (Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, 2011). The report contains suggestions for how the new Board of State and Community Corrections can absorb the priority duties and functions of this office, as per SB 92.

If you have any questions about this report, you can reach me at my new post as Assistant Chief of Community and Reentry Services at the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at colleen.curtin@cdcr.ca.gov. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Colleen Curtin
Former Chief Deputy Director
Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy

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Executive Summary

In May 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger announced his California Gang Reduction, Intervention and Prevention (CalGRIP) initiative to fund prevention, intervention, enforcement, job training and education strategies. Concurrently, the Governor and Legislature created the Governor's Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy (OGYVP), which opened its doors in September 2007.

OGYVP was established to fill a void in state leadership on the growing problem of gang violence. Specifically, the office was to examine state and local responses to gang and youth violence with an eye toward maximizing the effectiveness and coordination of existing programs. Its mission included researching the field of evidence-based practices to promote effective programs and strategies for addressing gang and youth violence. This report summarizes OGYVP's activities and accomplishments during its four years of operation. They include the following:

- Implemented the Safe Community Partnership (Ceasefire) strategy – the only proven approach to reducing gang violence – in nine California cities (Bakersfield, East Palo Alto, Fresno, Modesto, Oakland Oxnard, Richmond, Sacramento and Salinas), through CalGRIP grants and the support of three foundations. At least six of the cities have seen their homicides and nonfatal shootings drop dramatically.
- Published an authoritative report by national experts listing the programs and strategies that are most likely to prevent and reduce youth crime and violence – “evidence-based practices” – as well as those that have no effect.
- Encouraged the use of these evidence-based practices through two rounds of CalGRIP grants. Twenty-four cities are now working with experts to implement ten of these proven and promising programs.
- Awarded \$1.1 million to 24 probation departments to implement Aggression Replacement Training, an evidence-based practice that on average reduces

recidivism by 8 percent. These departments continue to work with experts to ensure proper implementation.

- Worked with the California Endowment to build the foundation for a statewide “Resource Center for Evidence-Based Practices.” Three probation departments (Fresno, Sacramento, and Santa Cruz) were awarded \$100,000 to implement evidence-based practices. An external consultant is working to assess the qualitative and quantitative outcomes and will use the findings to begin the development of a peer-to-peer knowledge base for the center.
- Provided CalGRIP grants to nine sites to implement the “Teacher Career Pathway,” a strategy developed in a CalGRIP-funded pilot project that saw 52 percent of the at-risk participants (31 of 60) proceed through community college and enter their senior year at California State University (CSU), Dominguez Hills.
 - ✓ Additional CSU campuses that have signed on to support the strategy include: Chico, East Bay, Fullerton, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Northridge, San Diego and San Francisco.
- Supplemented DOJ data for the years 2005 through 2009 with a survey of police and sheriffs’ departments that showed:
 - ✓ Gang-related homicides dropped by 27 percent statewide between 2005 and 2009.
 - ✓ In 2009, 50 percent of all homicides within Los Angeles County were gang-related, but only 25 percent of all homicides in jurisdictions outside of Los Angeles County were gang-related – though both areas had virtually the same number of gang-related homicides.
- Analyzed DOJ juvenile arrest data, revealing that although total juvenile arrests in California fell by 21 percent during the 11 year period between 1999 and 2009, 11 counties experienced an increase in violent offense arrests and 12 counties saw an increase in felony arrests between 2005 and 2009.
- Distributed \$36.8 million to 42 cities and 25 community-based organizations through four rounds of CalGRIP grants, administered by the California Emergency Management Agency.
- Distributed \$26.5 million to 45 job training and education agencies through five rounds of CalGRIP grants, administered by the California Employment Development Department.

On June 30, 2011, Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 92, which eliminated OGYVP effective January 1, 2012, but continues its core mission and functions at a newly-formed “Board of State and Community Corrections,” established by that same law. The Board of State and Community Corrections, formerly the Corrections Standards Authority, will become the lead state entity on adult and juvenile criminal justice policy on July 1, 2012. Its mission will be to prioritize state and federal funds, guide local policy and programming, provide technical assistance to local stakeholders and monitor criminal justice realignment efforts.

If criminal justice realignment is to succeed, the state must continue to play a role in providing policy guidance, support, technical assistance and oversight to the local level. This will better ensure consistency of programs, sharing of resources and accountability of funds. This report will offer recommendations on how the Board of State and Community Corrections can build on OGYVP’s accomplishments and advance its new mission to align fiscal policy and correctional practices by improving public safety through cost-effective, evidence-based strategies.

Introduction

Once thought to be a problem that affected only densely populated and crime-ridden urban cities, we know now that gang violence affects virtually every municipality, suburb and rural area of the state. In December 2010, there were at least 235,000 gang members in California.¹ Since 1981, there have been almost 17,000 gang-related homicides, according to data collected by the California Department of Justice and the Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy. In 2007, homicide was the second leading cause of death for California youth and young adults (ages 10 to 24). Homicide was *the* leading cause of death for African Americans ages 10 to 24 in California.² And though the number of homicides – including gang-related homicides – has decreased in the last six years, the percentage of those gang-related homicides that occur outside of Los Angeles County has grown.

As these gang and homicide figures attest, the traditional strategies used to address gang violence – enforcement- and suppression-driven tactics such as sweeps and arrests – have not had the desired effect. Indeed, most police chiefs and sheriffs now believe that we cannot arrest our way out of the gang problem. Law enforcement and community leaders agree that enforcement tactics alone will not address the root causes of gang and youth violence and are unlikely to have a sustained impact on affected communities. Any community that seeks to reduce its gang and youth violence, and mitigate the conditions that contribute to this violence, must take a comprehensive and enduring approach that includes the following:

1. A strategic plan that is community-wide, interdisciplinary and collaborative;
2. Participation by city and county leaders, city and county service agencies, criminal justice agencies, the business community, faith leaders, schools and community-based organizations;
3. A combination of approaches, including prevention, intervention, suppression, job training and placement, and education;
4. Programs, practices and strategies that have been demonstrated to be effective (evidence-based); and,
5. A mechanism to hold those implementing the strategy accountable for results.

In 2007, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced his California Gang Reduction, Intervention and Prevention initiative (CalGRIP) to fund coordinated prevention, intervention, enforcement, job training and education strategies. At the same time, the Governor and Legislature created the Governor's Office of Gang and

Youth Violence Policy (OGYVP), in part to identify programs and strategies that would in fact reduce crime and violence, and to provide targeted funding with CalGRIP dollars. OGYVP and its partners thus far have awarded more than \$64 million through three distinct CalGRIP grant programs:

- With the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal EMA), four rounds of competitive grants (\$9.215 million annually, totaling \$36.8 million) have been awarded – 84 grants to 42 cities and 26 grants to 25 community-based organizations.
- With the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the Employment Development Department (EDD), five rounds of Workforce Investment Act competitive grants (totaling \$26.5 million) have been awarded – 63 grants to 45 job training and education agencies.
- With the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA), \$1.1 million in federal juvenile justice funds have been awarded to 24 probation departments.

To make the biggest impact with its small staff, OGYVP narrowed the focus of its work to: 1) collecting and analyzing data to both better define the problem and measure the impact of programs; 2) promoting programs that have been rigorously proven to reduce crime and delinquency, 3) supporting prevention and intervention strategies for which early evaluations show promising outcomes; and, 4) collaborating with national and state experts to coordinate efforts and maximize resources.

Examining Gang and Youth Violence and California’s Response

Inventory of State Programs and Funding Streams

As a first step, OGYVP surveyed all state agencies, departments and offices to develop an inventory of state spending on gang and youth violence programs. The Little Hoover Commission had developed and included such an inventory in its June 2001 report, “Never Too Early, Never Too Late To Prevent Youth Crime & Violence.” That year (2000-01), the state spent almost \$1.2 billion on youth violence prevention programs. At the request of the commission, the Department of Finance identified 9 state entities administering 27 juvenile justice programs for at-risk youth in 2001. The Legislative Analyst identified 13 state entities/departments administering more than 40 crime prevention programs in 1999. The scattered nature of the state’s funding procedures led the Commission to issue the following finding as a part of its report:

State funding streams for local efforts are fragmented and uncoordinated. They do not support cooperative local efforts, ensure all communities have some resources, or prioritize funding to communities with the greatest needs.

OGYVP's survey revealed that little had changed since 2000/01 and little had been done to address the commission's findings. Through its own survey for Fiscal Year 2007/08, OGYVP found that the state spent more than \$1.5 billion on prevention and intervention grants to reduce gang and youth violence, reduce substance abuse, support after-school programs and provide job assistance to at-risk youth. These efforts continued to be uncoordinated and often duplicative, with public dollars allocated to multiple departments for the same purpose and to serve the same target population. Key findings included:

- The state allocated approximately \$1.5 billion (78 percent state and 22 percent federal) through 42 different funding streams, on grants to address gang and youth violence, administered by 14 offices in 8 departments.
- The state spent an additional \$600 million (77 percent state and 23 percent federal) on programs with the potential to reduce gang and youth violence. These included programs operated out of the departments of Mental Health and Public Health and apprenticeship programs out of the Department of Transportation.
- Finally – in addition to grant funding – the state delivered direct services through 24 programs at an approximate cost of \$83 million (80 percent state and 20 percent federal).

After analyzing the results of the inventory, OGYVP attempted to address the fractured nature of the state's policy-making and grant funding efforts in gang and youth violence prevention and intervention. In January 2009, OGYVP convened a working group comprised of leaders of 15 state agencies and departments to identify ways to streamline and better coordinate efforts. OGYVP asked for a commitment from these leaders to consider ways in which they could consolidate or "braid" grant programs, emphasizing not only the need to bring cohesion to the state's efforts, but also the need to simplify grants administration protocols for local stakeholders. In the end,

***Assembly Committee on Accountability and
Administrative Review
Recommendations, August 2009***

- *State agencies that administer youth crime prevention or juvenile justice programs shall seek to consolidate similar programs into block grants, wherever allowable by state and federal law, to be distributed to local agencies.*
- *The state's role will be to distribute the money in an equitable manner, require evidence based programs and determine outcomes that will be measured.*
- *The state shall work with local programs that show poor outcomes to improve the programs or shift money to more successful programs.*

most state agencies were reluctant to recommend changes that could lead to reduction or elimination, and this effort did not go far.

OGYVP's inventory also caught the attention of the Assembly Committee on Accountability and Administrative Review and prompted an August 2009 hearing titled, "Improving Efficiency and Accountability in Youth Crime Prevention and Juvenile Justice Funding." The committee agreed upon several specific recommendations to consolidate or eliminate programs and funding streams, several of which had already been recommended by the Legislative Analyst's Office, the Little Hoover Commission and the 2009 State Commission on Juvenile Justice. Though the committee unanimously passed several related recommendations (see inset, this page), there was not agreement on a corresponding legislative proposal.

The new Board of State and Community Corrections, charged with formulating state criminal justice policy and grant-making, will have the opportunity to follow through on many of these recommendations to streamline "like" grant programs.

Recommendations.

The Board of State of Community Corrections (BSCC) can advance efforts to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of state programs by:

- ◆ *Updating the inventory annually to ensure its accuracy and to track the state's progress in funding gang and youth violence programs.*
- ◆ *Convening an advisory committee to advance the effort to consolidate or "braid" state funding streams that have the same or similar program purpose, are allocated to the same entities, serve the same target populations and have the same desired outcomes.*
- ◆ *Making recommendations on how different funding streams could be grouped together under an "umbrella" or "single application" system to simplify both application and reporting requirements for local stakeholders.*

(Note: The Assembly Select Committee on Delinquency Prevention and Positive Youth Development recently updated OGYVP's program inventory and is pursuing related legislation through Assembly Bill 526.)

Collecting and Analyzing Criminal Justice Data

OGYVP was created, in part, to serve as a "one-stop shop" for communities looking for resources and data related to gang and youth violence. Consistent with its mission, OGYVP set out to more accurately measure the scale and characteristics of the gang problem in California through the development and analysis of reliable and accurate sources of data.

Understanding gang violence in California continues to be hampered by the lack of reliable and timely criminal justice data. The only information on gang violence

systematically collected statewide is the number of gang-related homicides reported by local law enforcement agencies to the California Department of Justice (DOJ). To assess that data for 2005 through 2007, OGYVP surveyed local law enforcement agencies for their gang-related homicides for the same time period. The survey revealed that the total number of gang-related homicides reported to DOJ for 2005 through 2007 represented only 64 percent of gang-related homicides statewide (1,767 of 2,771). A survey for the years 2008 and 2009 showed that the total number of gang-related homicides reported to DOJ represented only 73 percent of the total (1,037 of 1,418).

In a subsequent survey, law enforcement agencies gave three possible explanations for these discrepancies. First, most law enforcement agencies store crime data in their own local records management systems, which are generally more detailed and voluminous than what is submitted to the DOJ. Second, a number of homicides are classified as “gang-related” only after investigations are well underway; after the statistics have been reported to the DOJ. A third explanation could be that different agencies use different standards for classifying and reporting a crime as “gang-related.” Local law enforcement leaders said that reconciling these discrepancies would require additional resources and generate increased local costs.

To supplement the gang-related homicide data and paint a broader picture of youth violence in California, OGYVP compiled the following statistics and made them available by county on the CalGRIP website: Homicide and Gang-Related Homicide, 1999-2009; Juvenile Arrest Data, 1999-2009; and, Youth Victims of Homicide by Firearm, 1988-2009 (www.CalGRIP.ca.gov). OGYVP conducted analyses using some of these data sets to highlight trends and examine more closely gang and youth violence at the local level.

Juvenile Arrest Trends. This data showed that while juvenile arrests had decreased statewide over the last eleven years, that trend did not necessarily translate to the local level. In fact, some counties and cities saw increases in total, felony, violent offense, and/or misdemeanor arrests. Analysis of the juvenile arrest rates in 23 of the 30 largest counties and in 23 large cities showed that, while few counties varied from the statewide decrease over the past eleven years, many jurisdictions saw an increase in juvenile arrests within the last five years. During that period, 11 counties experienced an increase in violent offense arrests and 12 counties saw an increase in felony arrests. Of the 23 cities examined, 10 saw increased arrests for violent offenses and eight saw increased felony arrests during the same recent five-year period (2005 through 2009).³

Gang Homicide Trends. Homicide, the only gang-related crime data uniformly collected by local law enforcement agencies, is the best measure of gang violence in California. In 2004, the Attorney General’s Office recruited Professor George Tita, a

renowned criminologist and Allan Abrahamse, a mathematician, to publish an article on gang activity in Los Angeles, “Gang Homicide in L.A., 1981-2001.”⁴ Their goal was to quantify how changes in the pattern and level of homicide in Los Angeles County compared with the rest of the state. Being the most populated area of the state, some say that Los Angeles County “drives” California’s homicide rate and that gang homicide is largely responsible for changes in the Los Angeles rate. Tita and Abrahamse found that 75 percent of the 10,000 youth gang homicides that took place in California over a 21-year period (1981-2001) occurred in Los Angeles. This extraordinary disproportion could not be explained by Los Angeles’ large population, nor by its age, racial or ethnic composition.

In 2009, OGYVP asked Tita and Abrahamse to update their previous study, in light of the more recent homicide data provided by the DOJ (2002 through 2008). This subsequent study found that, while Los Angeles continued to “drive” statewide levels of homicide (especially gang homicide), there were important shifts underway in the rest of the state. At a state level, they found, the rate of gang killings had decreased since 2002. Further, from 2005-2009, the City of Los Angeles experienced a 30 percent drop in gang homicides. In contrast, the rest of the state experienced a nine percent increase in gang homicide. The counties with the largest increases were located principally in the Central Valley and points north (e.g., Tulare, Fresno, Stanislaus and Santa Clara Counties). The study confirmed what residents in these communities knew too well: gangs and gang violence are no longer a Los Angeles problem – they have robustly emerged throughout the state.⁵

Recommendations.

The BSCC can continue to build a repository of youth and gang-related crime data by:

- ◆ *Continuing to compile and track local gang-related homicide and other criminal justice data, both to measure and analyze the gang problem in California, and so that state policies reflect the need for localized responses.*
- ◆ *Working with the DOJ to address discrepancies in gang-related homicide data.*
- ◆ *Working with an advisory committee to consider other ways to measure and assess the gang problem in California that would not further burden local law enforcement agencies (e.g., using existing data to measure “gang-like” crime).*

Investing in Evidence-Based Programs and Strategies

The State of California invests more than \$1 billion annually in local efforts to prevent and reduce gang and youth violence. Counties invest another \$1 billion in their juvenile justice systems. But that investment strategy is not necessarily calculated to reduce recidivism and yield increased public safety, and the state is not able to track cost/benefit savings on the programs it supports. The broader scope of

the CalGRIP Initiative – and one of the reasons for the creation of OGYVP – was to research prevention and intervention programs to bring cohesion and focus to the state’s investment strategy in this area.

Only in the past 20 years have social scientists, policy-makers and practitioners begun to understand which programs and strategies in fact prevent and reduce youth crime. As its primary focus, OGYVP promoted the use of these “evidence-based practices,” that is, programs and strategies that have undergone rigorous evaluations to determine that they produce a desired outcome (decreased recidivism, improvement in problem behaviors, reduced substance use, etc.). OGYVP studied the field of evidence-based practices and became the vanguard in California’s effort to systematize and institutionalize the use of these programs and strategies at the local level. OGYVP firmly believes that state funds are best spent in support of these programs and strategies. To that end, OGYVP has incentivized – not required – the implementation of such programs through new grant funding, as outlined below.

1. Safe Community Partnership (the Ceasefire Project)

Background. In 1996, Boston developed a strategy – named Ceasefire – to address the record-breaking level of gang violence then raging through the city. Law enforcement, community and faith leaders and service providers together focused their attention on the city’s most violent gang members. At a face-to-face meeting called a “Call-In,” the partnership delivered a unified “no violence” message, explained that violence by a gang member would bring enforcement action to the entire gang, and offered services and alternatives to gang members. During the four years of implementation, Boston’s homicide rate decreased by 63 percent. The strategy has been replicated in numerous other cities during the past 15 years (Chicago, Cincinnati, High Point, Indianapolis, Stockton) with proven homicide reductions between 25 and 50 percent. Though this strategy has limitations (most cities have had difficulty sustaining it for more than four years), it remains the only proven approach to reducing serious gang violence.

"If you don't take these services and you don't allow us to help you, we will focus all of our law enforcement efforts to make sure you're not a safety issue to society."

- Lieutenant Bill Champion,
Sacramento Police Department

Using the CalGRIP grant as the vehicle, OGYVP incentivized the implementation of this strategy, now called the Safe Community Partnership. Cities that applied to implement the strategy (Ceasefire) received extra points through the competitive scoring process. In addition, three foundations – The California Endowment, the California Wellness Foundation, and the Kaiser Permanente Northern California Community Benefit Programs – contributed \$3 million to support the extensive training and technical assistance required to implement the strategy.

Outcomes. Four cities began implementation of Ceasefire in late 2009 and early 2010, funded by the second round of CalGRIP grants. An additional three cities began implementation in late 2010, funded by the third round of CalGRIP grants. Some of the dramatic outcomes are summarized below:

Modesto, which had a record-high number of homicides in 2009, began implementation of Ceasefire in February 2010. To measure the success of their efforts, Modesto compared crime statistics for the one-year period pre-Ceasefire with the one-year period post-Ceasefire (February 2009 to March 2010 versus February 2010 to March 2011). Modesto recorded the following crime outcomes:

- 42 percent reduction in gang-related homicides (from 12 to 7);
- 18 percent reduction in nonfatal gang-related shootings (from 33 to 27);
- 12 percent reduction in gang-related drive-by shootings (from 49 to 43);
- 17 percent reduction in all gang-related shooting incidents (from 92 to 76).

Modesto also reported impressive participant-level data. Modesto conducted a total of 11 Call-Ins, targeting 219 violent gang offenders. Of the 219 offenders that attended a Call-In, only 13 had been re-arrested as of May 2011. As of May 2011, the following numbers were recorded for Call-In participants:

- 186 requested follow-up services;
- 94 participated in family/community services;
- 87 received educational services; 70 demonstrated academic improvement;
- 52 received a high school diploma or GED;
- 46 received employment services;
- 34 chose to terminate gang involvement; and
- 28 participants enrolled in Work for Success, an after-school program designed to increase education and employment opportunities for at-risk youth.

Oxnard began implementation of Ceasefire (known in Oxnard as Operation PeaceWorks) in July 2009 and conducted its first Call-In in November 2009. Using the 12 months preceding the first Call-In as a baseline (November 2008 to October 2009), Oxnard has seen the following reductions in gang-related crime (compared to the 12-month period ending June 30, 2011):

- 44 percent reduction in total serious gang-related assaults (from 80 to 45);
- 62 percent reduction in gang-related assaults involving firearms (from 42 to 16);
- 67 percent reduction in gang-related homicides (from 6 to 2).

Oxnard conducted 13 Call-Ins, attended by 126 targeted gang members or gang affiliates. 63 individuals signed up for the job training/civic responsibility component of Oxnard's Ceasefire effort and 38 entered into the six-month program, known as Oxnard City Corps, where they agree to step away from violence in order to receive intensive case management and supportive services. An additional 16 individuals received services from Transformation Works, a program operated by a local community-based organization.

To assess the impact of Operation PeaceWorks, Oxnard examined the numbers of arrests and police contacts for program participants. The numbers prior to attendance at a Call-In were compared with numbers following the Call-In, through March 31, 2011. While in many cases there is significant disparity in time when comparing pre Call-In to post Call-In data, there is value to examining the numbers to determine trends. The data showed a notable change in behavior among this small group:

- The 38 City Corps participants accounted for a total of 1,074 arrests and contacts before their Call-Ins and only 113 after.
- The 16 Transformation Works participants accounted for a total of 484 arrests and contacts before their Call-Ins and only 53 after.
- Even those Call-In attendees that did not agree to enroll in services showed a significant change; those 63 individuals accounted for a total of 1,368 arrests and contacts before their Call-Ins and only 189 after.

Salinas, which had a record-setting number of gang homicides in 2009, began implementation of Ceasefire early that year. As a result of committed Ceasefire efforts, the city recorded dramatic reductions in homicides and shootings for 2010 and sustained those reductions in 2011. The outcomes below reflect percent change from 2009 to 2011 (2011 statistics reflect January 1, 2011 through December 12, 2011):

- 67 percent reduction in total shootings (including non-injury, injury and homicides); total shootings were 151 in 2009, 131 in 2010 and 50 in 2011.
- 63 percent reduction in non-fatal injuries; non-fatal injuries were 75 in 2009, 75 in 2010 and 28 in 2011.
- 59 percent reduction in homicides; homicides were 29 in 2009, 15 in 2010 and 12 in 2011.

Salinas targeted 203 offenders for participation in Ceasefire efforts and engaged 125 in a service plan. To assess the impact of the Ceasefire intervention on individual participants, the Salinas Police Department looked at the "before" and "after" crime statistics generated by those individuals. Data showed that, prior to May 2009 (pre-Ceasefire) these individuals generated the following crime statistics:

- Violent felony arrests: 149
- Weapons possession arrests: 155
- Victim of violence: 118

After May 2009 (post-Ceasefire), this same group of individuals generated the following statistics:

- Violent felony arrests: 13
- Weapons possession arrests: 14
- Victim of violence: 11

The first set of statistics represent the offenders' entire lives prior to engagement in Ceasefire and the second set of statistics represents just over two years after engagement in Ceasefire, so it is difficult to draw conclusions.

Nevertheless, the statistics are encouraging and show a positive trend, considering that these offenders were targeted in part because of their prolific criminal backgrounds.

"We strongly believe Ceasefire is the most promising intervention/enforcement strategy for addressing those at highest risk of committing violence in our community. We also believe Ceasefire is an integral part of our comprehensive approach and, when used in conjunction with other prevention, intervention, enforcement and re-entry strategies, holds the highest promise for long term violence reduction in Salinas."

*- Deputy Chief Kelly McMillin,
Salinas Police Department*

Fresno began implementation of Ceasefire in July 2010, having already experienced 50 percent more homicides in that year than during the comparable period of 2009. Fresno has held 16 Call-Ins since implementing Ceasefire, attended by 258 participants. Crime outcomes in Fresno were impressive:

- 71 percent reduction in gang-related homicides (from 14 to 4) in the six months following implementation (July through December 2010), as compared to the same six-month period in 2009.

"Bringing Broken Neighborhoods Back to Life," a part of Fresno's Ceasefire community engagement element, conducted 31 block parties in gang infested neighborhoods in 2011. More than 8,427 people attended the events and were connected with community resources; participating vendors enrolled 955 residents into services.

From an enforcement perspective, the Ceasefire strategy has allowed Fresno to construct and foster networks among its federal, state and local law enforcement partners. These networks have allowed agencies to leverage resources in efforts to be more effective in targeting violent gang members via Ceasefire strategies. Recidivism rate analysis for participants is conducted on a weekly basis and on average, only 3 percent are rearrested.

Bakersfield began implementation of Ceasefire in October 2010 and has conducted 14 Call-Ins (as of September 2011). From January through September 2011 (as compared to the same nine-month period in 2010), the city recorded a 33 percent reduction in fatal gang-related shootings. The average number of shootings between December 2010 and September 2011 decreased to 3.1 per month from 4.7 per month (as compared to December 2009 through September 2010).

During its seven months of implementation, Bakersfield invited 323 gang members identified as having the highest risk for being involved in gun violence to a Call-In. Of the 323 individuals invited to a Call-In:

- 208 (64 percent) attended a Call-In, hearing “stop the violence” message from prosecutors, law enforcement and community partners.
- Of those 208 individuals, 189 (91 percent) attended a follow-up service orientation sponsored by community and job development partners and enrolled in services.

Sacramento held its first Call-In in November 2010, after recording a 37 percent increase in crimes involving gang members from 2009 to 2010. A problem analysis pinpointed the area within the city with the highest number of firearms assaults and Sacramento focused on two groups within that target area that had been warring for almost two years. To underscore the urgency and scale of the problem, the Sacramento Police Department reported that 28 homicides and non-fatal shootings had been attributed to these two groups between May 2008 and June 2010.

- After implementation of Ceasefire enforcement actions, street outreach efforts and Call-Ins, there had been only one shooting attributable to the conflict between the two groups as of June 2011.

Sacramento also reported the following one-year crime outcomes for its Ceasefire efforts in the target area (November 2009 to June 2010 versus November 2010 to June 2011):

- 39 percent reduction in firearm assaults (from 18 to 11);
- 60 percent reduction in gang-related firearm assaults (from 5 to 2).

Sacramento tracked participant-level data to determine secondary outcomes. As of June 2011, Sacramento had conducted a total of eight Call-Ins, targeting 144 violent offenders from the two groups located within the project area. 92 of those 144 attended a Call-In (64 percent). One-year outcomes include:

- Of those 92 participants, 55 (60 percent) attended a follow-up service orientation sponsored by community and job development partners.
- Of those who attended an orientation, 33 (60 percent) went on to receive case management that included pre-employment and job-seeking skills, including resume building, interview techniques and workplace ethics.
- Of those who attended an orientation, 35 were placed in temporary subsidized employment, education services and job training.

Oakland began implementation of Ceasefire in September 2009 and held a total of 11 Call-Ins in the first 15 months of the program (through the end of 2010). Oakland has analyzed the effectiveness of those Call-Ins both qualitatively and quantitatively, using numerous metrics from changes in beat level and city-wide crime to individual outcomes. An analysis of the current program reveals that Call-In participants have had a significant reduction in arrests for violence or firearms charges post Call-In as compared to pre Call-In levels:

- Out of 88 participants from September 2009 through the end of 2010, 77 had prior arrests for violence or firearm violations (88 percent).
- As of April 2011, only 15 of the 88 participants had been rearrested on violent or firearms offenses (17 percent).
- Participants given job referrals were 45 percent less likely to be arrested on a probation/parole violation.

Note: Two additional cities were funded through the third round of CalGRIP grants, East Palo Alto and Richmond, but have not fully implemented the strategy and no outcome data was available at the time of this report.

Recommendations.

The BSCC can continue to develop and support Ceasefire efforts in California by:

- ◆ *Earmarking funding for Safe Community Partnership through the CalGRIP or other state or federal funding sources.*
- ◆ *Maintaining a relationship with the National Network for Safe Communities and serve as California's point of contact for Ceasefire, connecting California's progress to other state and national efforts.*
- ◆ *Continuing to collaborate with private foundations invested in enhancing public health through violence prevention (The California Endowment, The Wellness Foundation, etc.) to supplement SCP efforts.*
- ◆ *Continuing to collaborate with the Public Health Institute to support current efforts and be a conduit for information sharing between SCP cities.*

2. Teacher Career Pathway (Urban Teacher Fellowship)

The Pilot Project. While few if any career programs have been proven effective with the same degree of rigor as the programs on OGYVP's list of evidence-based practices, a project funded through the Employment Development Department's (EDD) CalGRIP Program continues to show promise. In 2008, the South Bay Center for Counseling – in partnership with Los Angeles Harbor Community College and California State University, Dominguez Hills (CSUDH) – obtained a CalGRIP grant to help 60 at-risk and gang-involved youth obtain their A.A. degree, B.A. degree and teacher certification in accelerated fashion. This pilot program was called the Urban Teacher Fellowship, or Teacher Career Pathway.

The designers of this innovative program hoped to succeed, where others had failed, by (1) dedicating the first semester to math and English remediation, (2) providing 24/7 case management support, and (3) providing part-time employment in after-school programs. While providing financial support for participants, employment in after school programs provides career-relevant work experience including exposure to effective classroom management techniques and direct experience with the broader community in the urban districts where it operates.

The pilot exceeded all expectations. Thirty-one (52 percent) of the original 60 participants completed their A.A. degrees with the program and transferred to CSUDH. Of the remaining 29 students, 23 stayed in post-secondary education but chose to follow other pathways or followed a traditional 2-year A.A. degree program (vs. the accelerated 18 month program). This means that *90 percent of the original cohort remained in post-secondary education.* It is important to note that although almost one-half of the original 60 students were at-risk of gang involvement or gang involved, their progress has proportionately matched those of the other participants.

"The long-term answer to gang violence requires investing in job training and education. These grants have the refreshingly high but reasonable expectation that gang-involved youth have what it takes to complete high school and college and embark on a teaching or social service career, if there is effective support."

- Paul L. Seave, former director
Governor's Office of Gang and
Youth Violence Policy

Of the 31 original students that remain enrolled at CSUDH, one has disenrolled to join the military. Three graduated with their B.A. degree in June 2011. Another six students are on track to graduate with a B.A. degree in winter 2011 and another six will graduate with a combined B.A. and teaching credential in spring 2012. All of the CSUDH students are employed, with the exception of one who chose to focus on school. Most students are teaching assistants now, working during the day; others have jobs to support themselves outside the industry while in school.

Additional Teacher Career Pathway Sites. Based on the success of the pilot project, OGYVP worked with EDD to earmark a portion of the Workforce Investment Act CalGRIP funding to replicate the Teacher Career Pathway at additional sites statewide. OGYVP met with representatives from the CSU Chancellor's Office, and Chancellor Charles B. Reed came onboard as a strong supporter of the model. With critical support from the Chancellor's Office, the community college system, several local workforce investment boards, after-school programs and community-based organizations, the Teacher Career Pathway (TCP) model expanded rapidly. In 2010, six CSU campuses received funding to implement TCP and in 2011, another three campuses received funding for TCP. The following nine CSU campuses are involved in the TCP project: Chico, Dominguez Hills, East Bay, Fullerton, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Northridge, San Francisco and San Diego.

Performance numbers for the six TCP sites funded in FY 2009/10 are listed in the table below:

Performance Numbers	Totals
Total Participants Enrolled	289
Enrolled in Training	239
Entered Post Secondary Education	228
Entered Customized Employer Based Training	31
Completed Post Secondary Education	34
Completed Industry Identified Training	43
Completed Industry Identified Soft Skills	60

Note: Participants enrolled in more than project component, so enrollment numbers do not add to total. Reporting period: 06/30/2010 - 10/31/2011.

Recommendations.

The BSCC can continue to foster the development of this promising strategy by:

- ◆ *Maintaining a relationship with EDD, the California State University and the Office of California Community Colleges to track the progress of Teacher Career Pathway sites.*
- ◆ *Working with EDD to construct a formal evaluation on Teacher Career Pathway sites.*
- ◆ *Promoting the Teacher Career Pathway as a best practice through other appropriate state or federal grant programs, perhaps by earmarking a portion of grant funding.*

2. “Brand-Name” Evidence-Based Programs

Developing California’s List of Evidence-Based Programs. In 2009, OGYVP asked Peter Greenwood, Ph.D., a leading expert in the field of evidence-based practice, to address the confusion surrounding the many practices described as “evidence-based” and the many websites listing such practices, and develop a list of the programs and strategies that rigorous research shows are most likely to prevent and reduce youth crime and violence. Dr. Greenwood, after consulting extensively with a panel of experts, authored the report and list “Preventing and Reducing Youth Crime and Violence: Using Evidence-Based Practices” (January 2010).⁶

The list (which has been updated since first published) describes 29 “brand-name” programs and 25 strategies that are suitable for implementation primarily by probation departments and schools, and 11 programs and strategies that research shows do not work. Brand-name programs are programs that were developed by a single investigator or team over a number of years. They have met rigorous selection criteria established by various review groups. The brand-name programs in Dr. Greenwood’s list are categorized as either “proven” or “promising,” depending on the number and type of evaluations conducted and whether or not outcomes have been replicated. The strategies identified in the list are techniques or approaches that have been shown through meta-analysis of scientifically credible evaluations to reduce recidivism. Examples of strategies include cognitive behavioral therapy, case management and mentoring.

Partnering with the Corrections Standards Authority

In 2009, as a part of the CalGRIP initiative, the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) awarded \$1.1 million in federal juvenile justice grants to 24 probation departments to implement Anger Management and Youth Violence Prevention Training, a curriculum based on the ART program model. The California Institute for Mental Health (CIMH), the state’s leading provider of training for ART and other evidence-based practices, is assisting most of the departments with implementation.

OGYVP recognizes that this list has limitations. It does not, for example, address all types of problems that can challenge a community afflicted by gang and youth violence. Nor does it address programs that have not been evaluated. Nevertheless, it does clarify what is most reliably considered to be evidence-based by four of the most reputable rating sources in the field and thereby places the state and communities in a better position to design a comprehensive public safety strategy.

Supporting Evidence-Based Programs through CalGRIP. The CalGRIP grant permits the implementation of a broad range of prevention, intervention and

suppression programs and strategies. OGYVP provided incentives for the use of the name-brand proven and promising programs through CalGRIP grants.

Evidence-based programs, because they are new and often run counter to traditional organizational approaches, are challenging to implement correctly. Yet they must be implemented correctly – with fidelity to the model – if they are to produce the desired outcomes. To increase the likelihood of successful implementation, OGYVP required organizations that were awarded funding for such programs: 1) to engage experts who will provide training and technical assistance, and 2) to report their outcome data (e.g., reduction in crime rates, results of pre- and post-surveys) so that their communities and the state can understand the extent of success and the need (if any) for program adjustment. OGYVP guided the grantees during the start-up and implementation phases, requiring that grantees identify the most appropriate training and technical assistance provider; identify a partner agency to provide service delivery; develop detailed work plans with objectives, tasks and timelines; and, set measurable outcomes and data collection procedures.

"They (OGYVP) focused on evidence-based programs and they actually required technical assistance to each of those agencies that were funded to make sure we were following the guidelines of these evidence-based programs."

*- Lieutenant Bill Champion,
Sacramento Police Department*

The third and fourth rounds of competitive CalGRIP grants administered by OGYVP and Cal EMA offered an incentive in the form of extra points to cities that applied to implement a designated evidence-based program. Of the 24 grants awarded (\$9.215 million) in FY 2009/10, 13 went to such applicants. Of the 24 grants awarded (\$9.215 million) in FY 2010/11, 19 went to such applicants. A total of 24 cities (several cities received funds in both rounds) are now implementing 10 of the evidence-based programs contained in the list.

Preliminary Measures of Success. The start date for the first set (FY 2009/10) of CalGRIP cities awarded funds to implement evidence-based programs (EBPs) was April 1, 2010; the start date for the second set (FY 2010/11) of cities was January 1, 2011. As stated above, when done correctly, the start-up and implementation phases of EBPs are painstaking and time-consuming. Before initiating service delivery, cities first had to finalize operating agreements with partner agencies, referral and selection processes, training and technical assistance contracts and data collection procedures. It took most CalGRIP cities 3 to 6 months for their selected EBP(s) to become fully operational and begin accepting referrals.

Only after an individual or family has completed the full “dose” of an EBP, can a city begin to measure whether there is a change in behavior as a result of the

intervention. As such, it is still too early to show “true,” or long-term, outcomes for the EBPs implemented in these cities. Cities are required to submit updates to OGYVP every six months, which include output data (numbers of individuals served) and some preliminary, or intermediate, measures of success.

The ten EBPs listed and described below have been implemented with CalGRIP dollars in the cities listed. The first set of cities to implement EBPs (FY 2009/10) recently submitted 18-month updates; a sampling of “preliminary results” among some of those cities is included.

✓ **Aggression Replacement Training**

Aggression Replacement Training (ART) is a multi-component cognitive behavioral intervention program to help chronically aggressive children and adolescents improve social skill competence and moral reasoning, better manage anger and reduce aggressive behavior. Program evaluations show that ART can reduce recidivism by 8.3 percent when implemented correctly. *Cities implementing ART include: **Bakersfield, Oakland, Sacramento, Salinas, San Bernardino and Santa Rosa.** Twenty-four counties also implemented ART under a grant from the Corrections Standards Authority.*

Sample of Preliminary Results

In 19 of the counties:

- 1,165 probation youth received ART in 19 counties through the end of December 2010.
- ART was implemented in three different settings: (1) juvenile hall; (2) other secure settings, such as camps and ranches; and (3) other settings, such as court and community schools.
- Participants showed improvement across all settings in anger control (5 percent improvement), prosocial skills (8 percent improvement) and moral reasoning (14 percent improvement).

✓ **Big Brothers Big Sisters**

Big Brothers Big Sisters of America is a national mentoring program with over 500 autonomously funded agencies. The Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) approach is to match at-risk youth with volunteer adult mentors. Evaluations conducted on the BBBS program show that participants are 33 percent less likely to hit someone than their control group counterparts. *Cities implementing BBBS include: **Anaheim, Oxnard, Pasadena, San Juan Capistrano and Santa Ana.***

Sample of Preliminary Results

In one city:

- 79 juveniles have been paired with an adult mentor.

- An average of 75 percent of participants showed improved academic performance.
- An average of 60 percent of participants improved classroom behavior.

✓ **Functional Family Therapy**

Functional Family Therapy (FFT) is an intensive, short-term, strength-based intervention for youth and their families. Families receive 12-26 therapy sessions over a 3-4 month period. Program evaluations show that FFT can reduce recidivism among participants by 18 percent when implemented correctly. *Cities implementing FFT include: **Mountain View, Long Beach and Sacramento.***

Sample of Preliminary Results

In one city:

- 27 families were actively engaged in FFT services.
- 302 FFT sessions were provided by trained therapists.
- 83 percent of parent participants reported that their family has changed for the better.
- 100 percent of parent participants reported that their adolescent's behavior has changed for the better.
- 100 percent of parent participants reported a reduction in family conflict.

✓ **Guiding Good Choices**

Guiding Good Choices (GGC) is a family competency training program that promotes healthy, protective parent-child interactions and reduces children's risk for early substance use initiation. It is based on the social development model, which theorizes that enhancing protective factors such as effective parenting practices will decrease the likelihood that children will engage in problem behaviors. Program evaluations show a 7.2 percent reduction in recidivism among the children of parents who receive the GGC curriculum. *Cities implementing GGC include: **Escondido, Oceanside, Vista and Watsonville.***

Sample of Preliminary Results

In one city:

- 130 parents have received the GGC curriculum.
- 81 percent of those surveyed reported improved family management, based on using the "family meeting" strategy to solve problems, discuss drugs and alcohol and plan "family fun."
- 80 percent of those surveyed report improved family communication skills, based on learning to use the skills from the GGC curriculum.
- 96 percent of parents in one cohort (24) reported that their children have had no alcohol-related incidents at school or in the community.

✓ **Life Skills Training**

Botvin LifeSkills Training (LST) is a substance abuse prevention program proven to reduce the risks of alcohol, tobacco, drug abuse and violence by targeting the major social and psychological factors that promote the initiation of substance use and other risky behaviors. Providers can expect to see a 50 to 75 percent reduction in tobacco, alcohol and marijuana use among youth that receive the LST curriculum. *Cities implementing LST include: **Gonzales, Hayward, Salinas, San Bernardino and Wasco.***

Sample of Preliminary Results

In one city:

- More than 243 students have received the Life Skills Training curriculum.
- 94 percent have shown a significant positive change in alcohol, tobacco or other drug (ATOD) use.

Most of the following programs were selected by the second set of cities (FY 2010/11), which did not begin implementation until spring of 2011 and do not yet have outcomes to report.

✓ **Nurse Family Partnership**

Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) consists of intensive and comprehensive home visitation by public health nurses during a woman's pregnancy and the first two years after the birth of the woman's first child. The program has been proven to reduce recidivism among both the mothers that participate in the program, as well as their children. Program evaluations have shown an average 38 percent reduction in recidivism for mothers and an average 15 percent reduction in recidivism for children. *City implementing NFP: **Bakersfield.***

✓ **Olweus Bullying Prevention Program**

The Olweus Bullying Prevention Program (OBPP) is a long-term, system-wide program for change involving program components at four levels: school, individual, classroom and community. OBPP is designed to improve peer relations and make schools safer, more positive places for students to learn and develop by reducing existing bullying problems among students; preventing new bullying problems; and achieving better peer relations at school. Program evaluations show significant reduction in reports of bullying and victimization in schools that deliver the program, as well as a reduction in general antisocial behavior such as vandalism, fighting, theft and truancy. *Cities implementing OBPP include: **Gonzales and Hollister.***

✓ **Parent-Child Interaction Therapy**

Parent-Child Interaction Therapy (PCIT) is aimed at conduct-disordered young children, placing emphasis on improving the quality of the parent-child relationship and changing parent-child interaction patterns. In PCIT, parents are taught specific

skills to establish a nurturing and secure relationship with their child while increasing their child's pro-social behavior and decreasing negative behavior. Program evaluations have shown that effective delivery of the program produces a 5 percent in recidivism among the participating youth. *City implementing PCIT: **Long Beach.***

✓ **Project Toward No Drug Abuse**

Project Toward No Drug Abuse (Project TND) is an effective drug abuse prevention program that targets high school-age youth from diverse ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. Project TND focuses on: motivation factors (i.e., students' attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and desires regarding drug use); skills (social, self-control, and coping skills); and decision-making. Program evaluations show a 22 percent reduction in 30-day marijuana use and a 26 percent reduction in 30-day hard drug use among Project TND participants. *Cities implementing Project TND include: **Hawthorne, Sacramento and Santa Barbara.***

✓ **Strengthening Families**

The Strengthening Families Program (SFP) is a universal, family-based intervention which enhances parents' general child management skills, parent-child affective relationships and family communication. Program evaluations show lower rates of alcohol initiation, as well as a 30 to 60 percent reduction in alcohol use and "being drunk," among the children of parents who receive the curriculum. *Cities implementing Strengthening Families include: **Salinas and Santa Rosa.***

Recommendations.

The BSCC can advance the use of evidence-based programs by:

- ◆ *Continuing to update and promote California's list of proven and promising evidence-based practices, prepared by Dr. Peter Greenwood for OGYVP.*
- ◆ *Continuing the practice of incentivizing the use of evidence-based programs and strategies through appropriate state and federal grant programs.*
- ◆ *Cultivating existing public/private partnerships (The California Endowment, The Wellness Foundation, etc.) to support and bolster state-funded efforts.*
- ◆ *Maintaining a relationship with Advancing Evidence-Based Practice and other state and national associations, connecting California's progress to the national movement and ensuring California has the most current information on EBPs and best practices.*

The Case for an EBP Resource Center or Clearinghouse

Evidence-based programs (EBPs) cannot be selected at whim and "dropped" into local communities. Nor can the state simply mandate that local stakeholders implement evidence-based programs (EBPs) and step back. Because successful implementation of EBPs depends on strict adherence to the program model,

structured training protocols, thorough data collection procedures and ongoing quality assurance guidelines, EBPs require a buy-in from those at both the top (executives and administrators) and bottom (line staff), a long-term investment from local government and – many times – a shift in organizational culture. It is important to build the foundation for EBPs by educating stakeholders on how EBPs can save money and produce desired results and why, therefore, it is important to make the investment.

There are many time-consuming tasks that must be completed in the start-up phase, before an agency can even begin accepting referrals, including: selecting the best local service provider (often through a bidding process); designing a referral process that will target the right population; developing working agreements with other agencies that will provide or track data; and, designing a simple evaluation protocol to capture outcomes.

In an exit survey, several CalGRIP grantees stated that they would have benefited from informational workshops up front, where they could learn about the various EBPs to decide which one best fit their target populations. Grantees also pointed to a need for regular stakeholder meetings, to share ideas and best practices with fellow providers. Regular site visits from state representatives and/or program experts would help grantees stay on track and address challenges that arise. A statewide resource center or clearinghouse could facilitate all of these services.

States that have been the most successful in institutionalizing the use of EBPs share a common feature – all have committed significant resources at the state level in the form of a statewide resource center or clearinghouse equipped to assist local organizations with program selection, risk assessment, training, technical assistance, data collection and evaluation. These resource centers or clearinghouses come in many forms and utilize different service delivery modalities, but their common goal is to prioritize and support the effective implementation of EBPs at the local level. The need for a state-level resource center or clearinghouse is based, in part, on the following assumptions:

- Implementation of EBPs is difficult and time-consuming.
- Local stakeholders need coordinated and reliable technical assistance to implement EBPs correctly.
- Local stakeholders are more likely to adopt EBPs when there is an incentive in the form of grant funds or no-cost technical assistance.
- Local stakeholders need assistance with data collection and evaluation.

The following states are at the forefront of the movement to institutionalize evidence-based programs within their states and have resource centers or clearinghouse models that could be replicated in California:

Connecticut: The Connecticut Center for Effective Practice was formed in 2001, in response to an identified need in the state to have a mechanism for providing information on best practices in child mental health and juvenile justice and to implement evidence-based practice on a large scale.

Oregon: In 2003 the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 267, which required that state agencies use "evidence-based programs" (EBPs) for drug and alcohol treatment, some mental health treatment, adult recidivism prevention and juvenile crime prevention. Affected agencies were required to dedicate 25 percent of funding for these programs to EBPs during the 2005-07 biennium. The percentage increased to 50 percent in the 2007-09 biennium, and 75 percent in subsequent biennia.

Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, through its Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), develops policy recommendations and oversees federal and state grant awards. Pennsylvania's OJJDP operates a resource center to promote and support the adoption of evidence-based programs within the state's juvenile justice system. The resource center has three primary areas of focus: support for those implementing established evidence-based program models; support for communities planning to choose appropriate models for implementation; and, support for improving the quality of interventions for juveniles in Pennsylvania.

Washington: Based on the results of a study undertaken by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, the 2007 Legislature allotted \$48 million in the biennial budget for the expanded use of evidence-based programs. Investments were made in many adult and juvenile justice programs, as well as in prevention programs—including drug treatment, education, vocational training, correctional industries, Functional Family Therapy, Multi-Systemic Therapy, Aggression Replacement Training, and early childhood education.

Recommendations.

To address the challenges surrounding the implementation of evidence-based programs (EBPs) and strategies, the BSCC should continue to build a repository of resources for local stakeholders by:

- ◆ *Resuming the work started by OGYVP, The California Endowment and the three targeted county probation departments to build a statewide Resource Center on EBPs, housed either at a university or at the BSCC, in partnership with a university.*
- ◆ *Developing an EBP cadre of experts that could convene on an as-needed basis, to provide peer-to-peer assistance to jurisdictions looking to implement an EBP.*

◆ *Dedicating staff at BSCC to become quasi-experts on the EBPs from Dr. Greenwood's list, establishing relationships with program developers and training providers, and working with local stakeholders on implementation challenges.*

A Promising Strategy: The 4 Cities 4 Peace (4C4P) Regional Collaborative

Background. Small cities and towns often are hindered by a lack of resources or personnel and are unable to provide comprehensive, innovative and sustained intervention and prevention services to combat gang and youth violence. Typically, each locale has its own police department and one or two community- or faith-based organizations. Separately, each locale approaches youth and gang violence on a local level, dealing with local problems within their own jurisdictions and from their own frames of reference.

In 2009, four small cities in the southern portion of California's Monterey County – which led the state in 2009 with the highest murder rate among more than three dozen of its most populous counties – decided to change their individual approaches. Using the funds provided by the CalGRIP grant, the cities took the opportunity to join forces, share resources and personnel, and confront regional problems from a regional perspective and with a regional plan. These cities – Gonzales, Greenfield, King City and Soledad – named the resulting collaborative “4 Cities 4 Peace (4C4P).” The cities signed a memorandum of agreement and Their collaborative model has evolved into a template strategy that is ripe for adaptation by other small jurisdictions in California.

The 4C4P model incorporates several prevention, intervention and suppression components. The model includes community outreach and education, evidence-based programs for at-risk youth and suppression efforts targeted toward the most violent offenders in the region. Leadership rotates among the four cities, so that all have an investment in the success and sustainability of the 4C4P initiative.

Accomplishments. As of December 7, 2011, the 4C4P partners have conducted 23 regional suppression operations/community mobilization efforts. These operations yielded the following: 150 arrests, 4,080 home visits, 4,860 people engaged in dialogue, 325 business/merchant contacts and 8,407 flyers distributed.

Outcomes. Soledad Police Chief Eric Sills reports that 15 months post-implementation – as a result of the 4C4P initiative – homicides went down by 63 percent in the south Monterey County region (from 16 to 6), as compared to the 15 months preceding the grant-funded operation. Furthermore, according to statistics released by the FBI, in 2010 three of the cities involved in the 4C4P initiative saw impressive reductions in violent crime:

- 29 percent reduction in Greenfield
- 18 percent reduction in Soledad
- 6 percent reduction in King City

While the 4C4P regional collaborative has made tremendous progress, recently released homicide statistics for 2010 show that Monterey County remains in the number one spot on the list of counties with the highest homicide rates in the state (10 per 10,000 residents in 2010, down from 11.8 per 10,000 residents in 2009). This county and others with multiple small jurisdictions must continue to make it a priority to share resources within a community-driven, regional and collaborative approach.

Recommendations.

The BSCC can continue to support the 4 Cities 4 Peace model in the following ways:

- ◆ *Work with the 4C4P Collaborative to finalize the development of a “tool-kit” that can be shared with other interested jurisdictions.*
- ◆ *Promote 4C4P as a best practice and/or earmark grant funding for small jurisdictions that commit to this model.*
- ◆ *Promote regional collaborations and sharing of resources, especially among small jurisdictions struggling with big gang problems.*

Untapped Opportunities

The following are ideas for initiatives that would further the mission of the new Board of State and Community Corrections as well as assist counties with the implementation of effective and cost-efficient realignment policies. OGYVP had begun to develop some of these proposals in partnership with the California Research Bureau, private foundations and local county executives.

- **Establish Standard “Juvenile Justice” Indicators for all 58 Counties**

California currently lacks a well-defined, publicly recognized set of indicators on the involvement of youth in criminal activity, gangs and the outcomes associated with the juvenile justice system. As a result, efforts to document those activities, expenditures and outcomes are inconsistent and time-consuming. This lack of key data impairs the ability of juvenile justice officials to effectively communicate the challenges facing the state to the public and policymakers, particularly with regard to funding, policy decisions and program design.

To enhance the state’s ability to provide funding and technical assistance in a strategic, consistent and coordinated manner, the Board of State and Community Corrections could explore opportunities to establish “key indicators” for juvenile

justice in California. Once established, these indicators could become valuable information tools for guiding realignment efforts, measuring the success of realignment policies, educating the public and informing policy and fiscal decisions that affect California's juvenile justice system.

- **Evaluate the use of EBPs in the Juvenile Justice System in Pilot Counties**

Working with The California Endowment and three county probation departments, OGYVP had begun the work of building a statewide resource center for evidence-based practices. A part of the plan was to administer an evaluation tool developed by Mark Lipsey, Ph.D., a pioneer in the field of evaluating evidence-based programs and strategies. The Board of Community and State Corrections could continue this effort, working with The Endowment, to engage Dr. Lipsey in administering his "Standardized Program Evaluation Protocols" to the three counties. After assessing the results, the SPEP could be administered to all remaining counties, so that all have a "score" and a corresponding "starting point" from which to make adjustments, bring in additional programs, update data collection tools, etc.

- **Convene a Performance Consortium in a Pilot County**

The term "performance consortium" refers to strategies that bring together organizations working toward common goals, to share lessons learned, to develop improvement strategies and to support benchmarking and other efforts that enable participants to understand their performance and achieve improvements.

A performance consortium on the topic of violence prevention could be undertaken in California. In a pilot county, the county executive would convene relevant county offices (including probation, mental health, child protective services, etc.) to: a) identify existing data measures that relate to juveniles who are (or are at high risk of becoming) delinquent, b) identify data that is needed, but not readily available, to effectively serve these juveniles and their families, c) identify what it would take to obtain the needed data, and d) create a pragmatic process to align the efforts of these agencies in assisting these juveniles and their families. The county executive, chief probation officer and other pertinent offices would meet 3-4 times a year with their colleagues in 2-3 other selected counties to compare their progress in identifying and developing effective data measures (indicators) and to compare their performance according to the data measures.

Conclusion

An analysis of gang-related homicide data from the last eight years confirms what local jurisdictions have known for some time – gang violence is no longer just a Los Angeles problem. It is a problem that afflicts communities large and small across the state. At the same time, the state's criminal justice system is undergoing

unprecedented changes. The state’s criminal justice realignment policy means that low-level offenders – once sentenced to state prison or parole – now will be sentenced locally, and left to the jurisdiction of the county sheriff or chief probation officer. Local resources, already stretched to capacity, will have to encumber this new population. More than ever, local leaders need to invest in programs that reduce recidivism and save public dollars. While there is no question that the hardest work will be done at the local level, the state has much to contribute – starting with promoting programs and strategies that have been rigorously demonstrated to reduce violence and delinquency and then fully supporting local efforts at implementation. The Board of State and Community Corrections, with its consolidated policy and grant-making functions, will be in an ideal position to take on these roles.

Endnotes

¹ CalGang® System, from a report produced on 12/14/10.

² “Lost Youth: A County-by-County Analysis of 2009 California Homicide Victims Ages 10-24,” Violence Policy Center, 2009.

³ “Juvenile Arrests in California, 1999-2009: Statewide and Local Rates and Trends,” Governor’s Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy, December 2010. Report can be downloaded at www.CalGRIP.ca.gov.

⁴ *At the Local Level, Perspectives on Violence Prevention*, California Attorney General’s Office, 2004.

⁵ “Homicide in California 1981-2008: Measuring the Impact of Los Angeles and Gangs on Overall Homicide Patterns” (Prepared by George Tita, Ph.D., and Allan Abrahamse for the Governor’s Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy), April 2010. Report can be downloaded at www.CalGRIP.ca.gov.

⁶ “Preventing and Reducing Youth Crime and Violence Using Evidence-Based Practices” and the attached list of proven and promising evidence-based programs and strategies can be downloaded at www.CalGRIP.ca.gov.